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 In 1898, the U.S. fought a short but transcendental war with Spain. As a 
consequence of that war, the U.S. acquired an “imperial archipelago” 
composed by Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines.1 Among them, 
the latter were, without any doubt, the most controversial of the new U.S. 
colonies. Too far from the U.S. homeland and too close to Asian conflicts and 
problems, with no direct historical links to the U.S., the Philippine islands were 
populated by a vast religious, ethnic, and culturally diverse population that 
seemed unassimilable to American society. 
The U.S. acquisition of the Philippines provoked an intense debate over 
the meaning and implications of U.S. colonial rule in the archipelago. The 
American population’s lack of knowledge regarding the Philippines created a 
need for information about their far-away colony, which was filled by a group 
of American scholars, writers, journalists, travelers, missionaries, and colonial 
and military officers. For more than thirty years they explained, classified, and 
described the Philippines and the Filipino people to the American public. In this 
process of knowledge production, they justify US colonialism questioning 
Filipino political capability, negating existence of a Filipino nation, 
misrepresenting Filipino history, and using alleged hostility between non-
Christian and Christian Filipinos to question their readiness for independence.  
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American imperialists also focused on security issues associated with the 
Philippines, arguing that the islands were a rich and strategic territory, 
surrounded by colonial powers eager for new colonies. Since Filipinos would 
not be able to protect their country, Filipino independence would inevitably 
pave the way for the conquest of the archipelago by a neighboring colonial 
power, ending the freedom and progress enjoyed by Filipinos under U.S. 
protection. They saw protection of the Philippines as an American 
responsibility that could only be fulfilled by American control of the 
archipelago.  
Filipino nationalists understood that, in order to promote Filipino 
independence, they had to fight the representation of the Philippines as a 
vulnerable and territory that could easily fall prey to imperial powers. 
However, their concerns were not only politically oriented. Filipino writers, 
scholars, politicians, and journalists developed a serious and genuine concern 
about Filipino security that drove them to look for answers to the Philippines´ 
defense problems. Their concerns were based on two basic elements: the 
archipelago’s geographic location and the international context. The Philippines 
were located in a strategic position between China and the Dutch East Indies, 
and very close to French Indochina. In other words, the islands were not only 
close to one of the largest world markets, but also to very important sources 
of raw materials. In addition, in the first decades of the 20th century, South East 
Asian international relations were characterized by imperialistic and militaristic 
competition among the colonial powers of the region, in particular the rise of 
Japan as a world power. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that 
Filipino survival as an independent country was a big issue of discussion for 
both Americans and Filipinos.  
In their search for answers for the Philippines´ “indefensibility,” they 




membership in the League of Nations, and the establishment of a U.S. 
protectorate as possible solutions. Some of them presented U.S. colonialism as 
the real menace for Filipino security and proposed independence as a self-
defense move to avoid dangers associated with U.S. colonial rule.  Some 
Filipinos argued that the Philippines could not been defended even by the U.S., 
and therefore, it was unfair to use indefensibility as an argument for rejecting 
Filipino independence. Finally yet importantly, they proposed the neutrality of 
the Philippines as an answer to the question about Filipino indefensibility. 
Neutrality was one of the solutions most discussed among Filipinos. 
Some of them presented neutrality as the only way to guarantee Filipino 
security after independence. However, other Filipinos argued that neutrality 
was a discredited idea that did not prevent the German army from invading 
Belgium during World War I. 
Neutrality was not only one of the main answers to the questions about 
Filipino indefensibility, but also one of the oldest. According to Filipino 
historian Lydia Yu-Jose, Filipinos used neutrality as an argument to justify 
independence since “the beginning of 1900.”2 In 1933, seventy years before Yu-
Jose’s statement, Pedro M. Blanco also identified neutrality as one of the main 
Filipino arguments for justifying independence. According to him, “no Filipino 
has ever advocated Philippine independence without incorporating the idea of 
neutrality, or some form of a protectorate, particularly the former. They see in 
neutrality a "safety device" that would permanently guarantee freedom of 
the Philippines.”3 Despite distance between their works, Yu-Jose and Blanco 
agreed that Filipino independence and neutrality were hand-to-hand. However, 
it is necessary to emphasize that the relation between neutrality and 
independence was not free from controversy. Neutrality of the Philippines was 
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a highly debated issue among Filipinos, American congressional representatives, 
and American imperialists.  
Today I will focus on the Filipino debate about neutrality. Since there are 
many Filipino books, articles, speeches, and lectures dedicated to this topic,4 I 
would like to focus only on two subjects: Javier Gonzalez’s 1915 article “La 
neutralización de las Filipinas” and Roberto Regala’s 1935 book, Neutrality of 
the Philippines.5 I choose these two works because there are twenty years 
between them and, therefore, they respond to two different historical 
contexts. One was published during First World War and the other a year 
after U.S. Congress approval of the Tydings McDuffie Act, defining a period of 
transition for Filipino independence, and in the middle of the convulsive 1930s. 
Despite these differences, they both responded to the same concerns: how to 
protect the Philippines after independence. 
Javier Gonzalez’s assessment has a strong trade bias. His main argument 
is that neutrality was “the international status that would better protect” the 
Philippines.6 For him, independence would end with American control over the 
Philippines’ trade, allowing the islands to trade with other countries. That 
openness would make Philippines neutrality attractive to other powers. For 
Gonzalez, neutrality was the preamble for a new kind of Open Door Policy for 
the Philippines that would guarantee access to the Filipino market for all world 
powers and, consequently, would secure integrity and security of the islands.7 
Gonzalez reminds his readers that China’s awakening was a matter of time. 
According to him, the Chinese people would eventually destroy foreigner’s 
commercial bases in China and when that happened, a neutral Filipino republic 
would become Western powers’ trade base in the Far East. In other words, he 
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presents the Philippines as a commercial option to China, but that could only 
be possible with independence and neutrality of the archipelago. 
Gonzalez also addresses a key question: Was neutrality a practical 
solution for Filipino security issues? To answer this question, he starts 
analyzing the international meaning of the neutrality of the Philippines. He 
focuses on three factors: first, in 1915, the year he published his book, all 
nations of the world were looking for American friendship; second, that the 
First World War would weaken European powers and their recovery would 
take time; and third, that American neutrality in the Great War had confirmed 
the U.S.’s pacific and friendly attitude. Thanks to these three elements, the 
Philippines’ neutrality would be welcomed and supported by the world 
powers.8 In other words, Gonzalez argues that the international context was 
excellent for Filipino neutrality thanks to the U.S.’s international prestige and 
pacifist stance, and due to the war that was destroying Europe.  
The war in Europe was very important for Gonzalez, because it would 
weaken the European powers, making them friendlier to the idea of a neutral 
Philippine Republic. The conflict would seriously undermine France, Germany, 
Great Britain, and Russia for at least fifty years and would make them welcome 
a neutral Philippines because they would not need to worry about the islands.9 
For him, a neutralized Philippines would have a positive influence on 
international relations by keeping the balance of power in Asia. 
What was necessary for a successful neutrality of the Philippines? 
According to Gonzalez, it was necessary that the Philippine Republic could be 
able to guarantee the security of foreign citizens and trade, especially, during 
wartime.10 For that, a centralized and powerful government was necessary “to 
put into effect internal laws and supported by a strong national defense that 
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could enforce a strict respect of Filipino neutrality.”11 In addition to a neutrality 
agreement, it was also necessary to ensure a Filipino stable, strong, and 
centralized government able to maintain domestic stability. Gonzalez saw as 
indispensable the development of military readiness so that Filipinos could be 
capable to defend their country. 
One of the main concerns about the neutrality of the Philippines was the 
question of its effectiveness. In other words, would other nations respect the 
Philippines’ neutrality? Was neutrality a practical solution for Filipino security 
issues? As a supporter of Philippine neutrality, Gonzalez could not avoid 
focusing on these questions, especially the Belgian precedent. The German 
invasion of Belgium during World War I was used to question the effectiveness 
of neutrality. Some writers and analysts argued that Germany’s violation of 
Belgium’s neutrality was proof of its ineffectiveness. Gonzalez rejects the use 
of German invasion of Belgium as argument against neutrality of the Philippines. 
According to him, the Philippines’ geographic location makes an invasion a very 
difficult task. In addition, a world power would not have to invade the 
Philippines in order to attack another power, like in the case of Belgium. 
Gonzalez argues that the Philippines’ strategic insignificance would guarantee 
its neutrality. The Philippines were not Belgium. They were not important or 
strategically located. Therefore, according to Gonzalez, it was, wrong and 
unfair to use what happened to Belgium in 1914 as an argument against Filipino 
independence. 
In his efforts to minimize any comparison with the Belgium experience, 
Gonzalez also underlines Great Britain’s strong reaction to Germany’s 
violation of Belgium’s neutrality. According to him, when the Germans invaded 
Belgium, the British government did not evade its commitment to Belgian 
neutrality. According to Gonzalez, the real cause of the war between Germany 
                                                




and Great Britain was Belgium and not necessarily the Anglo-German military 
an economic competition. It is not clear why Gonzalez thought that Great 
Britain, or other power, would react to a violation of the Philippines’ neutrality 
the same way that she reacted to the German invasion of Belgium, especially 
after he argued that the Philippines were strategically insignificant. It is not 
clear either, what did make Gonzalez see Great Britain -one of the main 
colonial empires- as a traditional protector of small nationalities.12 
Filipino independence would be especially favorable for the U.S. because 
the islands had become a liability for the Americans. According to him, U.S. 
withdrawal from the Philippines would reduce American military budget and 
would allow the U.S. government to strength its national defense by relocating 
its Army and Navy in American national coasts. In addition, in case of war, the 
Philippines would be easily conquered by any enemy of the U.S. Despite the 
negligible strategic and economic significance of the Philippines to the U.S., the 
latter would not tolerate the conquest of the islands by anyone. In that case, 
the U.S. would have no other choice but to send its Navy and Army thousands 
of miles away from American coasts and spend millions of dollars to recover 
the Philippines and restore American honor.13  Gonzalez proposes Filipino 
neutrality, and therefore Filipino independence, as an economic and strategic 
advantage for the U.S. The Americans could not defend the islands and, 
therefore, they were a menace to American honor. Filipino neutrality was 
necessary not only for Filipino security, but also for American security. 
Gonzalez insists that, by opening the islands´ trade to all nations,14 
Filipino independence and neutrality would help to reduce international 
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tensions and frictions. Filipino neutrality would not only transform the islands 
into a rich country, but would promote world peace by improving 
communication between the world powers.15 
Gonzalez also focuses on the possible impact of Filipino neutrality on 
Japanese-American relations. Although he argues that Japan was not interested 
in the Philippines, he also claims that neutrality of the islands would stabilize 
the Far East and avoid a war between Japan and the U.S. Gonzales 
acknowledges that American retention of the Philippines was a thorn in 
American-Japanese relations that could cause a war between the two nations. 
For that reason, Filipino independence and neutrality would improve 
American-Japanese relations and eliminate a source of political tension 
between Japan and the U.S. Filipino neutrality would also end Japanese 
international anxieties making unnecessary the so-called Asiatic Monroism and 
its trading menace for western nations.16 
Gonzales also addresses one basic question: which power could be a 
menace to the Philippines’ neutrality? According to him, Great Britain would 
not be a menace for the Philippines because the war in Europe would change 
British attitudes towards colonialism and make them realize that colonialism 
was the cause of international conflicts.17 It is not clear what made him think 
that the war would change Britain’s pro-colonial stance. Gonzalez also rejects 
any dangerousness to Filipino neutrality from France, Russia, and Italy because 
they were either not interested or too weak. 
Curiously, Gonzalez pays a lot of attention to Spain. His approach is very 
friendly and reflects a strong pro-Spanish viewpoint. He argues that Spain 
would not be a menace for the Philippines because she has shown “her benign 
policy toward the Philippines.”18 According to him, after the U.S., Spain was the 
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only power that would defend and protect Filipino independence because of 
her historical and cultural links with the islands.19 Maybe this strong pro-
Spanish stand could explain why this article was written in Spanish. Only a 
Hispanophile like him could argue that Spain would defend Filipino neutrality 
because of her maternal feelings toward the islands. In his presentation of 
Spain as Filipinos’ “madre patria” (“Motherland”), Gonzalez forgot the history 
of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. In addition, he imagined Spain as 
world power. It could be argued that in 1915 Spain was not in a position to 
give any support and help to the Philippines. 
About Germany, Gonzalez contends that even if the Germans could win 
the war in Europe, they would not be a menace for the Philippines because of 
their domestic problems and their geographic limitations. Besides, a German 
violation of the Philippines’ neutrality would provoke a reaction of the U.S., 
China, Japan, and all the other powers that would support the Philippines’ 
neutrality. Even if Germany rose victorious from the European war, a neutral 
Philippines would be safe thanks to the global balance of power.  
He also focuses on Japan, arguing that the Japanese Empire was not a 
menace to a neutralized Filipino republic. According to him, after the war in 
Europe, Japan would focus on the development of her colonies in Asia instead 
of looking for more colonies and more problems to deal with.20  He also 
argues that Filipino tropical weather was an obstacle for any Japanese interest 
in the Philippines. According to him, “weather differences between Japan and 
the Philippines was a decisive factor over this issue [Japan menace to the 
Philippines] because the Japanese, as well as the American and the European, 
could not endure tropical weathers.”21 For Gonzalez, a Japanese invasion of the 
Philippines would break the balance of power in Asia, causing serious problems 
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to Japan because other powers would not tolerate a Japanese conquest of the 
Philippines.22 A Japanese invasion of the Philippines would also damage Japanese 
relations with Great Britain, her main ally, and, therefore, weaken her position 
in Manchuria.23 In conclusion, a Japanese invasion of a neutral Philippines was, 
according to this author, against Japanese national interests.  
Gonzalez emphasizes the balance of power as the foundation of Filipino 
neutrality. For him, the Philippines’ neutrality would be safe because any move 
against the islands would break the balance of power in Asia, causing a strong 
reaction from the world powers. However, he acknowledges that there was a 
chance that no country would help the Filipinos in case of an invasion. If any of 
the signatory powers of a Philippines neutrality treaty did not react to a 
Japanese invasion, then Japan, or any other aggressor, would have to deal with 
Filipino national resistance.24 In another sample of his love for Spain, Gonzalez 
reminds his readers how the Filipinos resisted Spain’s “relatively benign 
sovereignty” and American liberalism as a proof of the task that any invading 
force would face in the Philippines.25 The conquest of the Philippines would be 
so costly that no power would want to pay for it. Gonzalez concludes that 
Filipino nationalism was the best resource for Filipino security.  
Twenty years after Gonzalez´ article, Filipino writer, lawyer, and 
diplomat Roberto Regala published a book entitled Neutrality of the Philippines. 
In his book, Regala collects a series of lectures he gave at the “University of 
the Philippines Alumni Institute” on April 8 and 9, 1935. For Regala, finding a 
solution to Filipino security issues was a priority because he writes just a year 
after the U.S. Congress took action on Filipino independence. In March 1934, 
the U.S. Congress passed, and Filipino Senate ratified, the Tydings-McDuffie 
Act granting independence to the Philippines after a transition period of ten 
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years. For Regala, independence was not anymore a possibility but a coming 
reality.26  
Roberto Regala was a Filipino writer, lawyer, and diplomat. He was the 
Philippines’ consul in San Francisco, ambassador to Australia (1950-1956), and 
minister in Israel and Austria. In 1958, he was appointed Justice of the 
Philippines Supreme Court.27 In his 1930s lectures, Regala analyzes Filipino 
neutrality from an international point of view. He argues that, in view of 
international circumstances, neutrality was the best option for the Philippines’ 
security after independence. According to him, 
Under the present trend of world events, neutrality of the 
Philippines will be the best guarantee for its security. […] It 
cannot be denied that the Philippines are not in a position to organize 
and maintain and standing army and navy, powerful enough to resist 
foreign aggression. The tragedy of our present position is that the 
moment the United States withdraw from the Islands, the 
security of the newborn Philippine Republic would be 
uncertain.28  
Regala argues that Filipinos would not be able to sustain independence after 
U.S. withdrawal from the archipelago. Therefore, Filipino independence, under 
the international tensions prevailing in the Far East, would open the door to a 
period of Filipino insecurity and uncertainty. Regala does not reject 
independence and the risks associated with her, but proposed neutrality as a 
security device for the Republic of the Philippines.  
How did Regala characterize the international context? He starts 
stressing that Filipinos should pay close attention to what is happening in Asia 
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because “the Pacific is fast becoming the center of world affairs.”29  Events like 
Japan’s protectorate over Manchukuo, the denunciation by Japan of the 
Washington and London Treaties,30 and Japanese fortification of the mandated 
islands of the Pacific were very important for the future of the Philippines. 
According to Regala, never was the balance of power in Asia more necessary 
for the Philippines than when he wrote his book. The end of that balance 
would mean a war between the colonial powers that would affect the 
archipelago. Regala is very straightforward: Japan’s aggressive foreign policy 
was not only a menace for Asia’s balance of power, but especially for the 
Philippines, because Japanese control of the Philippines “would make almost 
impregnable Japanese position in the Far East.”31  
Although Regala identifies Japan not only as a menace to the Philippines, 
but also as the big troublemaker of Asia, he is not anti-Japanese. On the 
contrary, to some extent, he justifies Japan’s aggressive foreign policies 
focusing on her economic problems. According to him, Japan’s foreign policy 
was determined by her economic needs and problems. Japan could not sell her 
commercial and industrial surpluses because of “heavy tariff walls, and other 
restrictions manifested in all the other parts of the world, which indirectly 
affects its foreign trade, it would not be strange if it should be forced to 
conquer other colonies or territories.” 32  For him, Japanese policy was a 
reaction against anti-Japanese trade policies of other countries. By closing their 
markets to Japanese markets, world powers forced the Japan to look for new 
markets by conquest.  
Regala’s conclusion is that neutrality was necessary because Filipinos 
could not defend their country, the Americans would not be in the Philippines 
forever, the Japanese were a serious menace to the archipelago, and the 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 See note 11 
31 Ibid. p. 15. 




islands were exposed and endangered by their location and the innovations in 
naval and aerial warfare. 
Although Regala argues in favor of the neutrality of the Philippines as the 
best way to protect the islands, he also makes clear that the Filipino people 
should not rely only in neutrality as sole guarantee for their security. 
According to him, “We [the Filipinos] cannot rely on the neutrality treaty for 
our security. The establishment of an adequate national defense might 
discourage foreign aggression.” 33  In other words, Regala proposed a 
combination of a neutrality treaty with a military preparedness program. 
Regala also focuses on one of the big issues about neutrality: its 
effectiveness. He recognizes that World War I had a negative impact over 
neutrality as a mechanism for peace and stability.  Germany’s violation of 
Belgium’s and Luxemburg’s neutrality “upset and placed in quandary the minds 
of many people, including the fervent advocates of neutrality, as of its 
effectiveness or practical utility” making necessary a “re-appraisal of neutrality 
as a practical guarantee or security for the political independence and 
territorial integrity of small states.”34 However, he reaffirms his believe that the 
Philippines’ neutrality was not only possible, but also necessary. Despite doubts 
about neutrality´s effectiveness, Filipinos had no better option that combining 
neutrality with military readiness and taking the risks of freedom. 
Despite the twenty-year distance between Regala and Gonzalez, both 
proposed neutrality of the Philippines as the best solution to Filipino security 
problems. For them, international context and issues left the Filipinos with no 
other solution than neutrality. Both defend neutrality effectiveness and viability. 
However, in some way, both also conclude that the Filipinos’ will and 
preparedness to defend their country was the ultimate and more reliable 
protection for the Philippines. 
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